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Abstract 
Purpose – While in developed economies, changes in monetary policy affect real economic 
activity in the short-run but only prices in the long-run, the question of whether these 
tendencies apply to developing countries remains open to debate. In this paper, we examine 
the effects of monetary policy on economic activity using a plethora of hitherto unemployed 
financial dynamics in inflation-chaotic African countries for the period 1987-2010.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – VARs within the frameworks of VECMs and simple 
Granger causality models are used to estimate the long-run and short-run effects respectively. 
A battery of robustness checks are also employed to ensure consistency in the specifications 
and results.  
 
Findings – But for slight exceptions, the tested hypotheses are valid under monetary policy 
independence and dependence. Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the 
long-run but not in the short-run. For the first-half (long-run dimension) of the hypothesis, 
permanent changes in monetary policy variables (depth, efficiency, activity and size) affect 
permanent variations in prices in the long-term. But in cases of disequilibriums only financial 
dynamic fundamentals of depth and size significantly adjust inflation to the cointegration 
relations. With respect to the second-half (short-run view) of the hypothesis, monetary policy 
does not overwhelmingly affect prices in the short-term. Hence, but for a thin exception 
Hypothesis 1 is valid.  
Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in the short-term but not in 
the long-term. With regard to the short-term dimension of the hypothesis, only financial 
dynamics of depth and size affect real GDP output in the short-run. As concerns the long-run 
dimension, the neutrality of monetary policy has been confirmed. Hence, the hypothesis is 
also broadly valid.  
 
Practical Implications – A wide range of policy implications are discussed. Inter alia: the 
long-run neutrality of money and business cycles, credit expansions and inflationary 
tendencies, inflation targeting and monetary policy independence implications. 
Country/regional specific implications, the manner in which the findings reconcile the 
ongoing debate, measures for fighting surplus liquidity, caveats and future research directions 
are also discussed.  
  
Originality/value – By using a plethora of hitherto unemployed financial dynamics (that 
broadly reflect monetary policy), we provide significant contributions to the empirics of 
money. The conclusion of the analysis is a valuable contribution to the scholarly and policy 
debate on how money matters as an instrument of economic activity in developing countries.   
 
JEL Classification: E51; E52; E58; E59; O55 
Keywords:  Monetary Policy; Banking; Inflation; Output effects; Africa 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 In large industrial economies, changes in monetary policy affect real economic activity 
in the short-term but only prices in the long-run. In transition and developing countries 
however, the question of whether monetary policy variables affect output in the short-run is 
open to debate (Starr, 2005). Conversely, the evidence of real effects in a developed economy 
is supportive of the idea that monetary policy can be used to counter aggregate shocks.  
Economic theory traditionally suggests that money influences business cycles, not the long-
term potential real output. This suggests monetary policy in neutral in the long-run. The 
neutrality of money has been substantially documented in the literature (Olekalns, 1996; 
Sarletis & Koustas, 1998; Bernanke & Mihov, 1998; Bullard, 1999; Bae et al., 2005; 
Nogueira, 2009). In spite of the theoretical and empirical consensus on this neutrality (Lucas, 
1980; Gerlach & Svensson, 2003), the role of money as an informational variable for decision 
making has remained open to debate (Roffia & Zaghini, 2008; Nogueira, 2009; Bhaduri & 
Durai, 2012)
1
.  
 The potential for using monetary policy in affecting real prices is also less clear. In 
countries that have experienced high inflation or in which labor markets are chronically slack, 
prices and wages are unlikely to be particularly sticky so that, monetary policy changes could 
pass quickly through prices and have little real effect (Gagnon & Ihrig, 2004). Moreover, the 
globalization of financial markets undercut the potential of independent policy by 
significantly eroding the ability of small-open economies to determine interest rates 
independently of world markets (Dornbusch, 2001; Frankel et al., 2004).      
In light of the above, three challenges are central in the literature. Firstly, the extent to 
which monetary policy affects output in the short-run and prices in the long-run in developing 
countries remains an open debate. Hence, the need to contribute to the scholarly and policy 
                                                 
1
 As a matter of fact, empirical literature provides mixed results and the outcomes are contingent on selected 
countries and historical periods under  investigation (Stock & Watson, 1999; Dwyer & Hafer, 1999; Trecroci & 
Vega-Croissier, 2000; Leeper  & Roush, 2002; Bae et al., 2005). 
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debates on the manner in which money matters in economic activity by providing an answer 
to the open question. Secondly, but for a few exceptions (Moosa, 1997; Bae & Ratti, 2000; 
Starr, 2005; Nogueira, 2009), the literature on the long-run economic significance of money 
has focused on developed countries for the most part. Evidence provided by these studies may 
not be relevant for African countries because their financial dynamics of monetary policy 
have different tendencies. For example, financial depth (liabilities) in the perspective of 
money supply is not as relevant in African countries because a great chunk of the monetary 
base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 2012a). Thirdly, the empirical 
investigation that has focused on monetary aggregates has failed to take account of other 
proxies that are exogenous to money supply. For instance, other financial dynamics of 
efficiency (at banking and financial system levels), activity (from banking and financial 
system perspectives), and size (credit of the banking sector in relation to that of the financial 
system) substantially affect the velocity of money and hence, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy (both in the short- and long-run). Indeed, financial allocation efficiency is a serious 
issue in African countries because of surplus liquidity issues (Saxegaard, 2006) and 
consequently limited financial activity (credit).  
The contribution of this paper to the literature is therefore fivefold. Firstly, it assesses 
the effects of monetary policy on output and prices in a continent (Africa) that has not 
received much scholarly attention. Secondly, there are certain specificities in monetary policy 
variables in developed economies that are not very relevant in Africa. Inter alia: on the one 
hand, financial depth in the perspective of money supply as applied in the developed world 
cannot be transported to Africa because a great chunk of the monetary base in the continent 
does not transit through the banking system; on the other hand, the effectiveness of the credit 
channel of monetary policy is an issue in Africa owing to the substantially documented 
surplus liquidity issues (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009). Thirdly, soaring food prices that 
have recently marked the geopolitical landscape of Africa have not been braced with adequate 
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short-run monetary measures to stem the rising price tide
2
. Fourthly, embryonic African 
monetary unions like the proposed West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) and East African 
Monetary Zone (EAMZ) need to be informed on the relevance of money as an instrument of 
economic activity (growth and price control). Fifthly, the use of a plethora of hitherto 
unemployed monetary policy variables complements existing literature by contributing to the 
empirics of monetary policy.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the debate and 
discusses monetary policy in Africa. The intuition motivating the empirics, the data and the 
methodology are discussed in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. The debate and African monetary policy  
 
2.1 The debate 
 
 For organizational purposes, we present the debate in two strands: the traditional 
discretionary monetary policy strand and, the second strand of nontraditional policy regimes 
that limit the ability of monetary authorities to use policy to offset output fluctuations.  
 In recent years, the rewards of shifting from traditional discretionary monetary policy 
to arrangements that favor commitments to price stability and international economic 
integration (such as inflation targeting, monetary unions, dollarization…etc) have been 
discussed substantially. An appealing prospect of discretionary policy is that the monetary 
authority can use policy instruments to offset adverse shocks to output by pursuing 
expansionary policy when output is below its potential and, contractionary policy when output 
is above its potential. For instance in the former situation, a policy-controlled interest rate can 
be lowered in a bid to reduce commercial interest rates and stimulate aggregate spending. 
Conversely, a monetary expansion that lowers the real exchange rate may improve the 
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 According to the Director General of the International Food Policy Research Institute, monetary and exchange 
rate responses were not effective in addressing food inflation (Von Braun, 2008).  
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competitiveness of a country’s products in domestic and world markets and thereby, boost 
demand for national output (Starr, 2005). As a matter of principle, a flexible countercyclical 
monetary policy can be practiced with inflation targeting (Ghironi & Rebucci, 2000; Mishkin, 
2002; Cavoli & Rajan, 2008; Cristadoro & Veronese, 2011; Levine, 2012).   
 In the second strand, nontraditional policy regimes limit the ability of the monetary 
authorities to use policy to offset output fluctuations. The degree to which a given country can 
use monetary policy to affect output in the short-term is open to debate. Findings for the US 
are consistent with the fact that, a decline in the key interest rate controlled by the Federal 
Reserve tends to boost output over the next two to three years. But the effect dissipates 
thereafter so that the long-run effect is limited to prices (Starr, 2005). Several studies have 
assessed whether the short-term effects of monetary policy on output in other countries are 
similar to those in the US. Mixed results have been found in seventeen industrialized 
countries (Hayo, 1999) and studies on two middle-income countries have found no evidence 
of Granger-causality from money to output, regardless of money used (Agenor et al., 2000). 
Hafer & Kutan (2002) find that, interest rate generally plays a relatively more important role 
in explaining output in twenty OECD countries while Ganev et al. (2002) find no such 
evidence in Central and Eastern Europe. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) places great 
emphasis on monetary policy in its programs for developing countries, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). It views such policy as crucial in managing inflation and stabilizing the 
real exchange rate. According to Weeks (2010), such an approach is absurdly inappropriate 
since the vast majority of governments in SSA lack the instruments to make monetary policy 
effective
3
.  
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 Weeks asserts that SSA lacks two main channels for implementing monetary policy: (1) trying to influence the 
creation of private credit through so-called open market operations or; (2) seeking to influence the borrowing 
rates for private sector by adjusting the interest rate at which commercial banks can borrow from the central 
bank.  
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2. 2 Monetary policy in Africa 
 
  Khan (2011) has looked at the relationship between the growth of GDP and different 
monetary aggregates in 20 economies of SSA and found empirical support for the hypothesis 
that credit-growth is more closely linked than in money-growth to the growth of real GDP. 
Mangani (2011) has investigated the effects of monetary policy on prices in Malawi and 
established the lack of unequivocal evidence in support of the conventional channel of 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. The findings suggest that exchange rate was the 
most important variable in predicting prices. The study recommends that authorities should be 
more concerned with imported cost-push inflation than with demand-pull inflation
4
. In a slight 
contradiction, Ngalawa & Viegi (2011) have also investigated the process through which 
monetary policy affects economic activity in Malawi and found that, bank rate is a more 
effective measure of monetary policy than reserve money.  
 Some studies have also focused on South Africa: with Gupta et al.  (2010a) finding 
that house price inflation was negatively related to money policy shocks; Gupta et al. (2010b) 
showing that during the period of financial liberalization, interest rate shocks had relatively 
stronger effects on house price inflation irrespective of house sizes and; Ncube & Ndou 
(2010) complementing Gupta et al. (2010ab)
5
 with the suggestion that, the direct effects of 
high interest rates on consumption appear to be more important in transmitting monetary 
policy to the economy than through indirect effects. Hence, the inference that monetary policy 
tightening can marginally weaken inflationary pressures (arising from excessive consumption) 
operating via house wealth and the credit channel. To demonstrate that monetary expansions 
and contractions may have different effects in different regions of the same country, Fielding 
                                                 
4
 According to Mangani (2011), in the short-run, pursuing a prudent exchange rate policy that recognizes the 
country’s precarious foreign reserve position could be critical in deepening domestic price stability. Beyond the 
short-run, policy stability could be sustained via the implementation of policies directed towards the construction 
of a strong foreign exchange reserve base (as well as developing a sustainable approach to the country’s reliance 
on development assistance).  
5
  Gupta et al. (2010ab) do not quantify the indirect effects of interest rate changes working through changes in 
house prices on consumer spending. Ncube & Ndou (2010) fill this gap by estimating and quantifying the role of 
house wealth in South Africa using disaggregated house prices.  
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& Shields (2005) have estimated the size of asymmetries across the nine provinces of South 
Africa (over the period 1997-2005) and found substantial differences in the response of prices 
to monetary policy. 
 Consistent with the position of Weeks (2010) on the inherent ineffectiveness of 
monetary policy in African countries discussed above, the insights from the ‘Blinder credit-
rationing model’ are useful in solidifying the intuition for African empirics.  According to 
Blinder (1987), a rethinking new monetary policy dynamics is needed at times: “The reader 
should understand that this is merely an expositional device. I would not wish to deny that the 
interest elasticity and expectational error mechanisms have some validity. But the spirit of 
this paper is that those mechanisms do not seem important enough to explain the deep 
recessions that are apparently caused by central bank policy” (p. 2). The postulation of 
Blinder is even more relevant when existing monetary and exchange rate responses have not 
been effective in addressing the recent food inflation (Von Braun, 2008).  
In light of the points presented in the introduction and the section above, the following 
hypotheses will be tested in the empirical section.  
Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the long-run but not in the short-run. 
Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in the short-term but not in the 
long-term. 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Intuition for the empirics  
  
Whereas there is vast empirical work on the effects of monetary policy on economic 
activity based on aggregate measures of money supply, there is yet (to the best of our 
knowledge) no employment of fundamental financial performance dynamics (that reflect the 
quantity of money supply) in the assessment of the long-run and short-term effects of 
monetary policy on output and prices.  With this fact in mind, we are aware of the risks of 
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“doing measurement without past empirical basis” and assert that reporting facts, even in the 
absence of past supporting studies (in the context of an outstanding theoretical model) may be 
a useful scientific activity. Moreover, applied econometrics has other tasks than merely 
validating or refuting economic theories with existing expositions and prior analytical 
frameworks (Asongu, 2012a,b). Hence, the need to understand the economic/monetary 
intuition motivating the employment of a plethora of financial   performance measures in the 
assessment of the incidence of monetary policy variables on economic activity.  
From a broad standpoint, money supply can be understood in terms of financial depth, 
financial allocation efficiency, financial activity and financial size. (1) Financial intermediary 
depth could be defined both from an overall economic perspective and a financial system 
standpoint. This distinction, as will be detailed in the data section is worth emphasizing 
because unlike the developed world, in developing countries a great chunk of the monetary 
base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 2012c). (2) Financial activity 
(observed from banking and financial system perspectives) reflects the ability of banks to 
grant credit to economic operators. (3) Financial allocation efficiency (from banking and 
financial system standpoints) that reflects the fulfillment of the fundamental role of banks (in 
transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators) could also intuitively be 
conceived as the ability of banks to increase the velocity of money. (4) Financial size (deposit 
bank assets/total assets) mirrors the credit allocated by banking institutions as a proportion of 
total assets in the financial system (deposit bank assets plus central bank assets). Hence, 
financial intermediary performance dynamics are exogenous to money supply and corrolarily 
monetary policy.  
The choice of the monetary policy variables is broadly consistent with the empirical 
underpinnings of recent African monetary literature targeting inflation (Asongu, 2013a, b) and 
real GDP output (Asongu, 2013c). These financial dynamic fundamentals entail all the 
dimensions identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the 
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World Bank (WB). We are not the first to think out of the box when it comes to the empirics 
of monetary policy. Blinder (1987) in assessing the effects of monetary policy on economic 
activity completely banished interest rate elasticities: “In order to make credit rationing 
mechanism stand out in bold relief, most other channels of monetary policy (such as interest 
elasticities and expectational errors) are banished from the model” (p. 2).  
 
3.2 Data 
 
We investigate a panel of 10 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) and the FDSD of the WB. The resulting balanced panel spans from 1987 to 
2010 due to constraints in data availability and the interest of obtaining results with updated 
policy implications. In a bid for robustness, we are poised to control for the period 2007-2009 
during which the rise in food prices was very substantial. Hence, a sub-panel of the period 
1987-2006 will be used to assess the consistency of findings.  
We are limited to only 10 African cross-sections because some countries in the 
continent inherently do not exhibit a unit root in consumer price inflation. Owing to the 
problem statements of the study, it is imperative to have non-stationary (chaotic) consumer 
price inflation for consistent long-run modeling. Hence, in accordance with recent African 
law-finance literature (Asongu, 2011), CFA franc
6
 countries of the CEMAC
7
 and UEMOA
8
 
zones have not been included
9
 in the sample. Beside these justifications  for eliminating CFA 
                                                 
6
The CFA franc is the name of two currencies used in sub-Saharan Africa (by some former French colonies) 
which are guaranteed by the French treasury.  The two currencies though theoretically separate are effectively 
interchangeable and include: the West African CFA franc (used in the UEMOA zone) and the Central African 
CFA franc (used in the CEMAC zone). 
7
 Economic and Monetary Community of  Central African States. 
8
 Economic and Monetary Community of  West African States.  
9
The need for inflation to reflect a unit root in order to accommodate the problem statement (and the exclusion of 
CFA franc countries) also draws from an inflation uncertainty theory in recent African finance literature. “The 
dominance of English common–law countries in prospects for financial development in the legal–origins debate 
has been debunked by recent findings. Using exchange rate regimes and economic/monetary integration 
oriented hypotheses, this paper proposes an 'inflation uncertainty theory' in providing theoretical justification 
and empirical validity as to why French civil–law countries have higher levels of financial allocation efficiency. 
Inflation uncertainty, typical of floating exchange rate regimes accounts for the allocation inefficiency of 
financial intermediary institutions in English common–law countries. As a policy implication, results support the 
benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes in financial intermediary allocation efficiency” Asongu (2011, p.1). 
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franc countries, the seminal work of Mundell (1972) has shown that African countries with 
flexible exchange rates regimes have more to experience in ‘money and inflation dynamics’ 
than their counterparts with fixed exchange rate regimes
10
.  
Consistent with the literature, the dependent variables are measured in terms of annual 
percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and real GDP output (Bordo & Jeanne, 
2002; Hendrix et al., 2009; Bae et al., 2005; Kishor & Ssozi, 2010; Moorthy & Kolhar, 2011). 
For organizational clarity, the independent variables are presented in terms of money 
(financial depth), credit (financial activity), efficiency and size.  Firstly, from a money 
perspective, we are consistent with the FDSD and recent African finance literature (Asongu, 
2013a, b) in measuring financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system 
perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits 
(Fdgdp) respectively. Whereas the former denotes the monetary base plus demand, saving and 
time deposits, the latter represents liquid liabilities of the financial system. It is interesting to 
distinguish between these two aggregates of money supply because, since we are dealing 
exclusively with developing countries, a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit via 
the banking sector.  Secondly, credit is appreciated in terms of financial intermediary activity. 
Thus, the paper seeks to lay emphasis on the ability of banks to grant credit to economic 
operators.  We proxy for both banking-system-activity and financial-system-activity with 
“private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb” and “private credit by deposit banks and 
other financial institutions: Pcrbof” respectively. Thirdly, financial size is measured in terms 
of deposit bank assets as a proportion of total assets (deposit bank assets plus central bank 
                                                                                                                                                        
Moreover, before limiting the dataset, we have found from preliminary analysis that, African CFA franc 
countries have a relatively very stable inflation rate.  
10
 “The French and English traditions in monetary theory and history have been different… The French tradition 
has stressed the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance of exchange stability with convertibility; 
stability has been achieved at the expense of institutional development and monetary experience. The British 
countries by opting for monetary independence have sacrificed stability, but gained monetary experience and 
better developed monetary institutions.” (Mundell, 1972,  pp. 42-43). 
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assets). Fourthly, financial efficiency
11
 measures the ability of deposits (money) to be 
transformed into credit (financial activity). This fourth measure appreciates the fundamental 
role of banks in transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. We adopt 
indicators of banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank 
credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial system credit on financial system deposits: 
Fcfd’).  
Whereas definitions of the variables and their corresponding sources are presented in 
Appendix 2, summary statistics (with presentation of countries) and correlation analysis are 
detailed in Appendix 1 and Appendix 3 respectively. From a preliminary assessment of the 
summary statistics, we are confident that reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge. The 
correlation analysis provides empirical validity for the theoretical categorization of banking 
and financial system indicators into fundamentals of depth, efficiency, activity and size.   
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
The estimation technique typically follows mainstream literature on testing the long-
run neutrality of monetary policy (Nogueira, 2009) and the short-run effects of monetary 
policy variables on output and prices (Starr, 2005). The approach involves unit root and 
cointegration tests that assess the stationary properties and long-term equilibriums 
respectively. In these assessments, the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is applied for 
long-run effects while simple Granger causality is used for short-term effects. While 
application of the former model requires that variables exhibit unit roots in levels and have a 
long-run relationship (cointegration), the latter is applied on the condition that variables are 
stationary (do not exhibit unit roots). Impulse response functions are used to further assess the 
tendencies of significant Granger causality results.  
 
 
                                                 
11
 By financial efficiency here, we neither refer to the profitability-related concept (notion) nor to the production 
efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Unit root tests 
 
We investigate evidence of stationarity with first and second generation panel unit root 
tests. When the variables exhibit unit roots in levels, we proceed to test for stationarity in their 
first difference. Employment of the VECM requires that the variables have a unit root (non 
stationary) in levels. Two main types of panel unit root tests have been documented: first 
generation (that supposes cross-sectional independence) and the second generation (based on 
cross-sectional dependence). Accordingly, it is convenient to perform several panel unit root 
tests to infer an overwhelming evidence in order to verify the order of integration of a series 
since none of these tests is immune from statistical shortcomings in terms of size and power 
properties.  With regard to the first generation tests, the Levin, Lin & Chu (LLC, 2002) and 
Im, Pesaran & Shin (IPS, 2003) tests are applied. Whereas the former is a homogenous based 
panel unit root test (common unit roots as null hypothesis), the latter is a heterogeneous 
oriented test (individual unit roots as null hypotheses). When the results are different, IPS 
(2003) takes precedence over LLC (2002) in decision making because, consistent with 
Maddala & Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis of LLC (2002) is too powerful. While IPS 
(2003) controls for cross-sectional dependence to a certain degree, Pesaran (2007) has put 
forward a test which allows for the presence of more general cross-sectional dependence 
patterns. This test can be considered as a second-generation of panel unit root tests. In 
accordance with Liew (2004), goodness of fit (or optimal lag selection) is ensured by the 
Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQC)  for the LLC (2002) and the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) for the IPS (2003) and Pesaran (2007) tests. Ultimately, Pesaran (2007) takes 
precedence over LLC (2002) and IPS (2003) in decision making. 
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Table 1: Panel unit root tests 
           
  Panel A: 1987-2010 
  LLC tests of homogenous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 3.23 1.78 0.24 -3.70*** -0.10 -1.47* 2.26 3.24 2.16 
ct 0.98 0.04 0.97 -5.48*** 0.49 0.35 -1.49* 1.84 -1.58* 
First 
difference 
c -8.39*** -6.28*** -4.64*** na -4.42*** -4.53*** -10.9*** -2.77*** -8.46*** 
ct -7.04*** -4.41*** -3.42*** na -2.96*** -3.52*** -10.9*** -2.73*** -8.26*** 
           
  IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 2.77 1.86 0.05 -2.50*** 1.24 0.06 3.94 -0.76 5.02 
ct 0.83 0.13 0.12 -3.29*** 0.20 0.38 -0.96 -1.86** -1.36* 
First 
difference 
c -7.30*** -7.50*** -7.15*** na -4.92*** -5.03*** -12.1*** -13.0*** -8.03*** 
ct -6.79*** -7.01*** -6.19*** na -3.64*** -4.14*** -11.9*** -8.70*** -7.66*** 
           
           
  Pesaran CADF Z (t-bar) test statistics 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c -0.15 -0.71 1.64 -0.01 0.26 -1.52* -2.18** 2.18 -1.79** 
ct 0.37 0.24 -0.15 -1.90** 1.10 0.36 0.13 -0.83 0.127 
First 
difference 
c -3.40*** -2.71*** -5.64*** -3.62*** -1.65** -2.48*** -4.02*** -7.23*** -5.22*** 
ct -2.10** -4.61*** -3.63*** -3.30*** -2.28** -2.64*** -1.93** -5.95*** -3.57*** 
           
           
  Panel B: 1987-2006 
   LLC tests of homogenous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c -0.80 -0.98 -1.60* -4.69*** -5.24*** -6.37*** 0.28 1.06 1.57 
ct 0.62 0.53 -1.43* -1.72** 0.68 0.94 -1.28 0.77 -0.95 
First 
difference 
c -7.27*** -5.69*** na na -2.43*** -2.37*** -6.43*** -12.0*** -5.64*** 
ct -6.21*** -5.35*** na na -4.81*** -5.03*** -6.21*** -8.24*** -7.51*** 
           
  IPS tests for heterogeneous panel 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c -2.07** -0.98 -1.97** -3.71*** -3.39*** -4.33*** 1.00 -2.18** 4.50 
ct -0.40 -0.82 -1.44* -2.12** 0.23 1.12 -0.60 -2.50*** -0.02 
First 
difference 
c -5.45*** -5.68*** na na -3.01*** -3.05*** -7.27*** na -4.79*** 
ct -5.03*** -4.80*** na na -4.81*** -5.31*** -7.54*** na -6.14*** 
           
           
  Pesaran CADF Z (t-bar) test statistics 
  F. Depth (Money) Fin.  Efficiency F. Activity (Credit) F. Size  Inflation Output 
  M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba   (CPI) GDP 
Level c 0.36 -0.06 -0.72 -1.29 0.00 -0.77 -2.85*** 13.32 0.21 
ct 0.31 0.65 -1.06 -0.63 2.04 1.90 -0.56 -0.11 1.47 
First 
difference 
c -2.62*** -1.88** -4.56*** -2.11** -2.79*** -2.29** -3.27*** -5.95*** -3.33*** 
ct -1.50* -3.27*** -3.20*** -2.22** -1.77** -1.70** -1.70** -3.57*** -2.65*** 
           
Notes: ***, **, *denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. 
Maximum lag is 6 and optimal lags are chosen via HQC for LLC test and the  AIC for IPS and Pesaran (2007) tests.. LLC: Levin, Lin & Chu 
(2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran & Shin (2003).  M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid Liabilities. BcBd: Banking System Efficiency. FcFd: Financial 
System Efficiency. Pcrb: Banking System Activity. Pcrbof: Financial System Activity. Dbacba: Deposit Bank Assets on Total Assets. CPI: 
Consumer Price Inflation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. CADF: Cross Augmented Dickey Fuller.  
 
Table 1 above reports the panel unit root tests results. While Panel A presents the 
findings for the period 1987-2010, Panel B is for the 1987-2006 span. Based on two 
information criteria (‘constant and trend’ and Pesaran (2007)), only financial system 
efficiency in Panel A is stationary in levels. Hence, the findings indicate the possibility of 
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cointegration (long-run equilibrium) among the variables; because, in line with the Engel-
Granger theorem, two variables that are not stationary may have a linear combination in the 
long-run (Engle & Granger, 1987). 
 
4.2 Cointegration tests 
 
Consistent with the cointegration theory, two (or more) variables that have a unit root 
in levels may have a linear combination (equilibrium) in the long-run. In principle, if two 
variables are cointegrated, it implies permanent movements of one variable affect permanent 
movements in the other variable. To assess the potential long-run relationships, we test for 
cointegration using the Engle-Granger based Pedroni test, which is a heterogeneous panel-
based test. Whereas we have earlier employed both homogenous and heterogeneous panel 
based unit roots tests in Section 4.1, we disagree with Camarero & Tamarit (2002) in applying 
a homogenous Engle-Granger based Kao panel cointegration test because, it has less 
deterministic components. Accordingly, application of Kao (1999) in comparison to Pedroni 
(1999) presents substantial issues in deterministic assumptions
12
. The same deterministic 
trend assumptions employed in the IPS (2003) unit root tests are used in the Pedroni (1999) 
heterogeneous cointegration test. However, like in panel unit root tests, panel cointegration 
tests also suffer from cross-sectional dependence. A second-generation cointegration test such 
as Westerlund (2007) can control for cross-sectional dependence via bootstrapping. The 
choice of bivariate statistics has a twofold advantage (justification): on the one hand, it is 
consistent with the problem statements and on the other hand, it mitigates misspecification 
issues in causality estimations.
13
                                                 
12
 Whereas Pedroni (1999) is applied in the presence of both ‘constant’ and  ‘constant and trend’, Kao (1999) is 
based only on the former (constant).  
13
 For example, multivariate cointegration and corresponding error correction model may involve variables that 
are stationary in levels (See Gries et al., 2009).  
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Table 2: Bivariate heterogeneous Pedroni  Engle-Granger based panel cointegration tests 
               
 Panel A: 1987-2010 
 Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) & Inflation Financial Allocation Efficiency & Inflation Financial Activity (Credit) & Inflation Fin. Size & Inflation 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking System Financial System   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
   Panel v-Stats -0.502 0.095 -0.396 -1.263 -0.410 -1.821 na na -0.421 -1.659 -0.227 -1.396 -0.009 -1.931 
Panel rho-Stats 1.497 1.860 -0.753 -1.033 -2.278** -2.072** na na -1.198 -1.287* -1.308* -1.649** -2.634*** -2.147** 
Panel PP-Stats 1.883 1.563 -1.540* -2.810*** -3.583*** -4.979*** na na -1.972** -3.450*** -2.006** -3.986*** -4.370*** -5.481*** 
Panel ADF-Stats 1.985 1.673 -1.692** -2.542*** -3.592*** -5.872*** na na -2.229** -3.687*** -1.898** -4.465*** -5.072*** -6.880*** 
               
Group rho-Stats 2.504 2.549 -0.393 0.142 -1.366* -0.440 na na -0.772 -0.068 -1.260 -0.802 -0.839 -0.234 
Group PP-Stats 2.657 2.176 -2.349*** -4.288*** -4.113*** -4.475*** na na -2.718*** -3.580*** -3.075*** -4.617*** -4.958*** -5.616*** 
Group ADF-Stats 2.735 1.466 -2.387*** -3.927*** -2.381*** -3.711*** na na -2.840*** -3.759*** -2.725*** -4.730*** -3.762*** -4.341*** 
               
 Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) & Output  Financial Allocation Efficiency & Output Financial Activity (Credit) & Output Fin. Size & Output 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking System Financial System   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
  Panel v-Stats 1.285* 1.364 -0.954 2.030** -1.318 2.157 na na -1.056 1.983** -1.194 1.934** 0.242 2.026** 
Panel rho-Stats -0.530 0.855 0.987 0.850 1.595 0.423 na na 1.549 1.066 1.957 1.038 -0.876 0.565 
Panel PP-Stats -1.275 0.028 0.792 -0.445 1.829 -0.954 na na 1.828 -0.097 2.482 -0.121 -1.350* -0.563 
Panel ADF-Stats -2.637*** -0.118 0.573 -1.275 0.444 -1.568* na na 0.479 -0.845 1.402 -0.827 -0.690 -0.259 
               
Group rho-Stats 0.840 1.895 1.908 1.721 2.242 1.680 na na 2.211 2.155 2.723 2.144 0.113 1.258 
Group PP-Stats -0.501 0.885 1.453 0.188 2.907 0.257 na na 2.462 0.854 3.412 0.847 -1.877** -0.115 
Group ADF-Stats -2.213** 0.176 0.678 -0.943 0.962 -2.207** na na -0.181 -2.011** 0.998 -1.984** -0.022 -1.076 
               
 Panel B: 1987-2006 
 Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) & Inflation Financial Allocation Efficiency & Inflation Financial Activity (Credit) & Inflation Fin. Size & Inflation 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking System Financial System   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
   Panel v-Stats -0.983 -1.302 -0.806 -0.981 -0.739 -1.683 -1.046 -1.608 -0.375 -0.769 -0.574 -0.878 -0.457 -2.042 
Panel rho-Stats -0.114 -1.341* -0.046 -1.255 -1.468* -1.295* -0.701 -1.279 -0.854 -1.984** 0.419 1.752 -2.415*** -1.738** 
Panel PP-Stats -1.027 -3.916*** -0.736 -3.487*** -2.913*** -4.255*** -2.046** -3.452*** -1.604* -4.633*** -0.170 1.090 -4.197*** -5.140*** 
Panel ADF-Stats -1.090 -3.932*** -0.774 -3.225*** -3.199*** -5.253*** -2.379*** -3.530*** -1.318* -3.517*** -0.367 -0.563 -4.730*** -6.970*** 
               
Group rho-Stats 0.711 0.093 0.699 -0.023 -0.406 0.269 0.205 0.168 -0.208 -0.610 1.376 2.743 -0.418 -0.027 
Group PP-Stats -1.586* -4.151*** -1.724** -3.573*** -3.024*** -3.510*** -2.193** -3.336*** -2.004** -4.254*** 0.210 2.126 -4.607*** -5.146*** 
Group ADF-Stats -1.403 -3.891*** -1.382* -3.396*** -2.970*** -3.665*** -2.312** -2.786*** -1.708** -3.113*** -1.409* -0.580 -3.711*** -4.306*** 
               
 Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) & Output Financial Allocation Efficiency & Output Financial Activity (Credit) & Output Fin. Size & Output 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking System Financial System   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
   Panel v-Stats -0.788 3.893 -0.544 3.859*** -0.497 2.918*** -0.844 2.085** -0.495 2.538*** -0.349 2.178** 0.643 1.818 
Panel rho-Stats 2.296 0.847 1.940 0.768 1.824 0.763 2.035 1.091 1.644 1.140 2.059 1.007 -0.522 0.411 
Panel PP-Stats 3.194 0.641 2.651 0.481 2.485 -0.063 2.800 0.412 2.076 0.555 2.943 0.418 -0.642 -0.723 
Panel ADF-Stats 3.348 -1.056 2.575 -1.005 3.100 -0.923 3.227 -1.411* 1.735 -0.589 2.873 -0.624 -0.610 -1.575* 
 
              
Group rho-Stats 2.929 1.714 2.711 1.463 2.553 1.821 2.979 2.191 2.554 2.289 2.931 2.198 0.626 1.347 
Group PP-Stats 4.218 0.807 3.769 0.248 3.610 -0.228 4.285 1.103 2.988 1.597 4.054 1.397 -0.418 -0.166 
Group ADF-Stats 3.555 -0.820 2.496 -1.205 4.145 -1.736** 3.815 -0.877 2.175 0.006 3.488 -0.036 -1.129 -1.187 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. Fin: Financial. PP: Phillips-Peron. ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller. na: not 
applicable because one variable in the pair is stationary in levels.  
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Bivariate Westerlund panel cointegration tests 
               
 Panel A: 1987-2010 
 Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Inflation 
  
 Financial Depth (Money) & Inflation Financial Allocation Efficiency & Inflation Financial Activity (Credit) & Inflation Fin. Size & Inflation 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking System Financial System   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
Gt (Z-value) 4.079 2.848 4.703 3.463 0.011 -3.203*** na na 2.777 2.422 2.035 1.701 3.476 2.509 
Ga (Z-value) 2.491 2.952 2.860 3.189 1.492 0.005** na na 3.246 3.952 2.811 3.469 2.714 1.983 
Pt (Z-value) 2.602 1.709 3.194 2.586 -0.642 -3.828*** na na -1.683* -0.643 -2.793** -0.941 3.237 3.090 
Pa (Z-value) 1.594 1.079 2.031 1.421 -0.398 -1.760** na na -0.741 0.927 -1.442* 0.820 1.991 2.197 
               
BP CD Test (Chi²) 272.455*** 321.310*** 205.605*** 200.705*** 259.741*** 250.188*** 283.760*** 
               
               
 Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Real GDP Output 
  
 Financial Depth (Money) & Output Financial Allocation Efficiency & Output Financial Activity (Credit) & Output Fin. Size & Output 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking System Financial System   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
Gt (Z-value) 1.835 2.983 2.582 3.988 0.075 2.412 na na 1.579 6.313 0.789 5.377 -0.064 2.436 
Ga (Z-value) 1.748 2.861 1.631 3.166 0.632 3.148 na na 0.780 4.064 0.188** 3.736 -0.011* 2.739 
Pt (Z-value) -3.362** 0.802 -3.595** 1.061 0.474 3.200 na na -3.565** 2.554 -3.221*** 2.314 0.614 3.377 
Pa (Z-value) -1.902* 1.112 -3.151** 0.864 0.469 2.668 na na -4.279** 1.056 -4.152*** 1.107 -1.258 2.160 
               
BP CD Test (Chi²) 203.372*** 210.310*** 205.128*** 181.099*** 160.262*** 174.266*** 164.590*** 
               
               
 Panel B: 1987-2006 
 Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Inflation 
  
 Financial Depth (Money) & Inflation Financial Allocation Efficiency & Inflation Financial Activity (Credit) & Inflation Fin. Size & Inflation 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking System Financial System   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
Gt (Z-value) 1.352 0.583 1.339 0.358 -2.007** -1.555* -5.494*** -3.859*** -3.909*** -2.032** -4.418*** -2.355* 2.276 0.236 
Ga (Z-value) 2.053 2.772 2.051 2.539 1.081 2.287 0.487* 2.076 0.959 3.023 0.744 3.131 2.659 3.182 
Pt (Z-value) -0.077 -0.002 -0.276 -0.324 -3.930** -3.145* -6.317*** -5.269** -4.560** 0.083 -3.668** -0.003 2.761 4.953 
Pa (Z-value) -0.671 0.889 -0.485 0.771 -0.671 1.476 -1.530** 1.106 -1.503* 1.587 -1.494** 1.535 1.550 2.988 
               
BP CD Test (Chi²) 220.303*** 251.117*** 170.652*** 174.723*** 184.055*** 206.727*** 192.462*** 
               
 Cointegration between Monetary Policy and Real GDP Output 
  
 Financial Depth (Money) & Output Financial Allocation Efficiency & Output Financial Activity (Credit) & Output Fin. Size & Output 
 Money  Supply Liquid Liability Banking System Financial  System Banking System Financial System   
 c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct 
Gt (Z-value) 3.098 1.147 3.554 1.222 -2.284** 0.047 -4.796*** -2.329** -1.410* 3.186 -2.348** 2.385 -1.984** -0.266 
Ga (Z-value) 3.365 3.290 3.263 3.293 0.248* 2.484 0.515* 2.164 1.613 4.196 0.996 3.869 0.978* 3.009 
Pt (Z-value) -0.728 1.338 -0.880 1.962 -1.549 -0.467 -4.850** -2.179 -2.966* 0.694 -1.164 1.324 -1.910* 1.898 
Pa (Z-value) 0.569 2.090 0.387 2.254 -0.282 1.530 -0.651 1.194 0.031 2.159 -0.656 1.825 -0.616 1.900 
               
BP CD Test (Chi²) 222.781*** 242.643*** 182.564*** 176.632*** 205.288*** 231.835*** 131.766*** 
               
               
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ respectively. Fin: Financial. The lag and lead lengths are set to one. Choosing too many lags and 
leads can result in a deterioration of the small-sample properties of the test. To control for cross-sectional dependence, robust critical values is obtained through 300 bootstrap replications. BP CD Test: Breusch-Pagan 
LM test of independence.  
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Tables 2-3 above present the Pedroni and Westerlund cointegration results 
respectively. Panel A (B) in both tables presents findings for the period 1987-2010 (1987-
2006). In Table 2, based on the information criterion of ‘constant and trend’, there is absence 
of cointegration between money supply (financial system activity) and inflation in Panel A 
(B). There is overwhelming (scanty) evidence of long-run equilibriums between monetary 
policy variables and inflation (output). These findings are broadly consistent with the 
predictions of economic theory which indicates that monetary policy has no incidence in real 
output in the long-run, but affects prices in the distant future. Put in other words, the absence 
of a long-run relationship between monetary policy variables and output shows the long-term 
neutrality of money.  It follows that, permanent changes in financial intermediary dynamics 
(exogenous to monetary policy) do not affect permanent changes in real GDP output in the 
long-run. Hence, the need to assess short-run effects by simple Granger causality (Section 
4.4). Conversely, permanent movements in monetary policy variables influence prices in the 
long-tem. Hence, the need to examine the short-term adjustments to the corresponding 
equilibriums with the VECM (Section 4.3).  
The inferences above fail to consider the presence of common factors that affect 
monetary policy across countries. Table 3 presents bivariate Westerlund cointegration tests 
that control for cross-sectional dependence
14. Based on the information criterion of ‘constant 
and trend’, while the long-run neutrality of money is still broadly confirmed, evidence of 
cointegration between monetary variables and inflation is scanty.   
Modeling with the VECM and simple Granger causality (unrestricted VAR) will be 
based on the hypotheses of cross-sectional dependence and independence in cointegration for 
the following reasons. Firstly, it eases comparison of the present study with prior 2007 
Pedroni-based literature. Accordingly, studies before the emergence of the Westerlund (2007) 
                                                 
14
 The Breusch-Pagan (BP) LM test of cross-sectional independence is overwhelming rejected.  The BP LM test 
is chosen because T>N (24>10 for the 1987-2010 period and 20>10 for the 1987-2006 period).   
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test still constitute useful scientific activity. Secondly, both assumptions are necessary to fully 
examine the postulated hypotheses under investigation. Thirdly, new comparative insights 
into monetary policy independence and dependence could emerge. For instance, if no 
significant differences in results emerge it could be established that monetary policy 
dependence does not really matter.  Fourthly, as an intuition for independence, African 
monetary union countries (with the likelihood of common monetary policies) have not been 
considered in the dataset. Fifthly, the assumption of independence matters only for the 
money-inflation nexus and not for the money-output linkage because Westerlund (2007) is 
consistent with Pedroni (1999) on the long-run neutrality of money. Hence, one of the 
underlying hypotheses motivating the study remains sound. Sixthly, the label of ‘empirics’ on 
the paper’s title means we can make the assumption without being afraid of ‘econometrics 
polices’.  
 
4.3 Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) for Monetary Policy and Inflation  
 
Let us consider inflation and money with no lagged differences, such that: 
    
titi MoneyInflation ,,                                                              (1) 
 
The resulting VECMs are the following for Eq. (1): 
 
titititi MoneyInflationInflation ,1,1,, )(                          (2) 
 
titititi ekInflationMoneyMoney ,1,1,, )(                            (3) 
 
 In Eqs. (2) and (3), the right hand terms are the Error Correction Terms (ECTs). At 
equilibrium, the value of the ECT is zero. When the ETC is non-zero, it means that inflation 
and money have deviated from the long-run equilibrium; and the ECT helps each variable to 
adjust and partially restore the equilibrium relationship. The speeds of these adjustments are 
measured by   and    for inflation and money respectively. Therefore, Eqs. (2) and (3) are 
replicated for all the ‘finance and inflation’ pairs. The same deterministic trend assumptions 
employed in the cointegration tests are used. 
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Table 4: Vector Error Correction Model (Cointegration and short-term adjustment coefficients) 
    
Panel A: 1987-2010 
                                   Estimates of cointegration relationships  
         
Financial 
Depth 
(Money) 
Money Supply na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
        
Liquid Liabilities  --- 2.854 --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.126)      
Financial 
Allocation 
Efficiency  
Banking System  --- --- 4.259 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.245)°     
Financial System  --- --- --- na --- --- --- 
        
Financial 
Activity 
(Credit) 
Banking System  --- --- --- --- 13.750 --- --- 
     (0.500)   
Financial System  --- --- --- --- --- 15.716 --- 
      (0.627)  
Financial 
Size 
Banking System --- --- --- --- --- --- 29.542** 
       (2.169) 
         
                                                Estimates of short term adjustment coefficients  
         
 D[Inflation] na -0.204*** -0.190*** na -0.200*** -0.202*** -0.253*** 
   (-5.182) (-5.044)°  (-5.136) (-5.139) (-5.469) 
Financial 
Depth 
(Money) 
D[Money Supply] na --- --- --- --- --- --- 
        
D[Liquid Liabilities] --- -0.0001** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (-2.552)      
Financial 
Allocation 
Efficiency  
D[Banking System] --- --- -0.0003 --- --- --- --- 
   (-1.054)°     
D[Financial System] --- --- --- na --- --- --- 
        
Financial 
Activity 
(Credit) 
D[Banking System] --- --- --- --- -0.0000887 --- --- 
     (-1.292)   
D[Financial System] --- --- --- --- --- -0.0000960 --- 
      (-1.342)  
Financial 
Size  
D[Banking System ] --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0004** 
       (-2.095) 
         
          Panel A: 1987-2006 
          Estimates of cointegration relationships 
         
Financial 
Depth 
(Money) 
Money Supply 9.365 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.404)       
Liquid Liabilities  --- 10.445 --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.370)      
Financial 
Allocation 
Efficiency  
Banking System  --- --- 8.639 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.398)°     
Financial System  --- --- --- 7.892 --- --- --- 
    (0.398)°    
Financial 
Activity 
(Credit) 
Banking System  --- --- --- --- 21.662 --- --- 
     (0.618)   
Financial System  --- --- --- --- --- na --- 
        
Financial 
Size  
Banking System --- --- --- --- --- --- 58.027*** 
       (4.742) 
         
                   Estimates of short term adjustment coefficients 
         
 D[Inflation] -0.203*** -0.207*** -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.202*** na -0.286*** 
  (-4.448) (-4.552) (-4.396)° (-4.403)° (-4.509)  (-4.840) 
Financial 
Depth 
(Money) 
D[Money Supply] -0.0002*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-3.059)       
D[Liquid Liabilities] --- -0.0001** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (-2.455)      
Financial 
Allocation 
Efficiency  
D[Banking System] --- --- -0.0002 --- --- --- --- 
   (-0.679)°     
D[Financial System] --- --- --- -0.0001 --- --- --- 
    (-0.582)°    
Financial 
Activity 
(Credit) 
D[Banking System] --- --- --- --- -0.0000768 --- --- 
     (-1.225)   
D[Financial System] --- --- --- --- --- na --- 
        
Financial 
Size  
D[Banking System ] --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.0007*** 
       (-3.522) 
         
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The deterministic trend assumptions and lag selection criteria for the 
VECM are the same as in the cointegration tests. ( ): t- statistics. D[ ]: First difference. °: values also apply for the monetary policy 
dependence hypothesis.  na: absence of cointegration or stationary in  levels.  
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 Table 4 above shows results for the VECM. While the findings  in the upper-sections 
of both panels are consistent with Eq. (1), those in the lower-sections correspond to Eqs (2) 
and (3). Specifically, the first line in the lower-sections (D[Inflation]) corresponds to Eq. (2) 
whereas, the estimates shaping the diagonal are consistent with Eq. (3). The signs of the 
cointegration relations in the upper-sections of the panels are in accordance with the 
predictions of economic theory. This confirms the existing consensus that in the long-run, 
money has a positive relationship with inflation. Among the long-run relationships of 
monetary policy variables, that of financial size is the most significant. In other words, the 
ratio of bank assets in proportion of total assets (Deposit bank assets plus Central bank assets) 
has the most significant positive relationship with inflation in the long-run.  
The lower-sections of the panels of Table 4 show feedbacks coefficients for the 
cointegrating vectors or the short-run adjustments of inflation and the monetary policy 
variables. Some adjustments are significantly different from zero, implying that these 
monetary policy variables are not weakly exogenous with regard to the parameters of the 
cointegration relationships in the upper-sections.  In case of any deviation from the long-run 
equilibriums, these variables respond and adjust the system back to the equilibrium 
relationships. Only the monetary policy variables of financial depth and financial size are 
particularly significant in adjusting inflation to the equilibrium. Monetary policy 
fundamentals of credit and ability of banks to transform money into credit are not significant 
in adjusting inflation to the equilibrium. Therefore, in event of disequilibriums in the long-
run, short-term adjustments in the ability of banks to transform money into credit do not 
matter in significantly correcting inflation.  A possible and logical explanation for this 
outcome is the substantially documented surplus liquidity issues in African financial 
institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009). This is robustly confirmed by the insignificance 
of the credit adjusting estimates of financial activity. Hence, allocation inefficiency and 
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correspondingly, limited financial activity (credit) partially explain these insignificant 
contributions of credit and allocation efficiency in error correction. The ECTs have the 
expected signs and are in the right interval for a stable error correction mechanism (See the 
last point on robustness checks in Section 4.6 for discussion).  It should be noted that the 
discussion above is both relevant for the hypotheses of independence and dependence in 
monetary policy. The degree sign (°) in Table 4 has been used to emphasize values that 
represent both.  
Consistent with the Engle-Granger theorem, we examine short-run effects of the 
nexuses under investigation if the pairs are either not cointegrated or a variable is stationary in 
levels. 
 
4. 4 Granger Causality for Monetary Policy and Economic Activity  
 
 Let us consider the following basic bivariate finite-order VAR models: 
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti MoneyInflationInflation ,,
0
,
1
,   



             (4) 
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti evMoneykOutputhOutput ,,
0
,
1
,  



                    (5) 
 
Simple Granger causality is based on the assessment of how past values of a monetary 
policy variable could help past values of inflation in explaining the present value of inflation 
(Eq. 4). In the same line of thought, it also implies investigating how past values of monetary 
policy variables are significant in helping the past values of output to explain the present 
value of output (Eq. 5). In mainstream literature, this model is applied on variables that are 
stationary.  
In light of the above, the resulting VAR models in first difference (for pairs that have 
failed the cointegration test) are the following:  
tiijti
q
j
ijjti
p
j
ijti MoneyInflationInflation ,,
0
,
1
,   



                  (6) 
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tiijti
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ijti evMoneykOutputhOutput ,,
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,  



                      (7) 
 
 The null hypothesis of Eq. (4) is the position that, Money does not Granger causes 
Inflation. Therefore, a rejection of the null hypothesis is captured by the significant F-
statistics; which is the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis that estimated parameters of 
lagged values equal zero. Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is in accordance with the 
AIC (Liew, 2004).  
Table 5: Short-run Simple Granger causality analysis  
        
 Panel A: Hypothesis of Monetary Policy Independence 
 Panel A1: 1987-2010 
        
 Monetary policy does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) 0.231 nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1st  Difference 1.741 1.812 0.0198 nc(sl) 0.671 0.511 1.463 
        
 Monetary policy does not cause Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels nc(sfd) na na 1.468 na na na 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1st  Difference 0.455 na na nc(sl) na na na 
        
        
 Panel A2: 1987-2006 
        
 Monetary policy does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels  nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1st Difference  2.513* 2.695* 0.028 0.005 1.700 1.224 2.647* 
        
 Monetary policy does not cause Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels  na na na na na nc(sfd) na 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st Difference  na na na na na 0.439 na 
        
        
        
 Panel B: Hypothesis of Monetary Policy Dependence  
 Panel B1: 1987-2010 
        
 Monetary policy does not cause Real GDP Output 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels  nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) 0.231 nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
        
1st Difference 1.741 1.812 0.019 nc (sl) 0.671 0.511 1.463 
        
 Monetary policy does not cause Inflation 
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
Levels  nc(sfd) nc(sfd) na 1.468 nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st Difference 0.455 1.153 na nc(sl) 0.393 0.403 0.118 
        
        
 Panel B2: 1987-2006 
 Monetary policy does not cause Real GDP Output 
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 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st Difference 2.513* 2.695* 0.028 0.005 1.700 1.224 2.647* 
        
 Monetary policy does not cause Inflation 
        
 Financial Depth (Money) Financial  Efficiency Fin. Activity (Credit) Fin. Size 
 M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba 
        
Levels nc(sfd) nc(sfd) na na nc(sfd) nc(sfd) nc(sfd) 
        
 D[M2] D[Fdgdp] D[BcBd] D[FcFd] D[Pcrb] D[Pcrbof] D[Dbacba] 
1st Difference 0.387 0.420 na na 0.424 0.439 0.260 
        
Null Hypotheses of Panel A1: Monetary Policy does not Granger cause real GDP output and Monetary Policy does not Granger cause 
inflation. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit (Banking System Intermediary Efficiency). 
FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits (Financial System Intermediary). Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks (Banking 
System Intermediary Activity). Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial System 
Intermediary Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank asset on Total assets (Banking System Size). Fin: Financial. Notes: ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. na: not applicable because of cointegration. nc(sl): no cointegration and stationary in levels. 
nc(sfd): no cointegration and stationary in first difference.  
 
 
Table 5 above presents the Granger causality results. Within the framework of this 
study, we are applying the model only to pairs that have failed the cointegration test (na). 
Accordingly, the ‘not cointegrated’ (nc) pairs may either be stationary in levels (sl): nc(sl) or 
in first difference(sfd): nc(sfd).  While Panel A shows results based on the hypothesis of 
monetary policy independence, Panel B depicts findings grounded on the hypothesis of 
monetary policy dependence. From horizontal and vertical comparative standpoints, two main 
findings can be established. Firstly, for both samples and either hypothesis, monetary policy 
does not affect prices in the short-run. Secondly, consistent across hypothetical specifications 
for the period 1987-2006, financial depth and financial size affect real output in the short-run. 
The overwhelming absence of significant causalities flowing from monetary policy to 
inflation in the short-term is consistent with economic theory and in line with expectations. 
The simple fact that monetary policy dynamics (of depth and size) granger cause real GDP 
output is not enough to draw any economic inferences. Hence, impulse-response functions 
(IRFs) of the nexuses will provide additional material on the scale and timing of output 
responses to monetary policy innovations.   
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4.5 Impulse responses  
 
Using Choleski decomposition on a VAR with ordering: 1) output, 2) a monetary 
policy variable; we compute IRFs for output and financial fundamentals of depth and size. 
Appendix 4 shows Figures 1-3 for the VAR ordering: output, monetary policy; while 
Appendix 5 shows Figures 4-6 for the VAR ordering: monetary policy, output. In the 
graphical representation of the IRFs, the dotted lines are the two standard deviation bands 
which are used to measure the significance (Agénor  et al., 1997, p. 19). By virtue of the 
causality analysis, whereas we are more concerned with the first VAR ordering, the second 
VAR ordering has been presented simply for robustness purposes.  
Based on the first VAR ordering, from intuition we expect a positive shock 
(expansionary policy) in monetary variables to positively affect real GDP output in the short-
term and a negative shock (contractionary policy) to negatively affect real GDP output in the 
short-run. Accordingly, the innovations and responses in Figures 1-3 are consistent with our 
intuition and economic theory. Firstly, from Figure 1, a one standard deviation positive shock 
(innovation) in money supply sharply increases output in the first period before the effect 
steadily decreases during the next three years and finally disappears in the fourth year. 
Secondly, the dynamic responses of Figure 2 broadly confirm those of Figure 1. A one 
standard deviation innovation in liquid liabilities increases real GDP output sharply during the 
first period, the effect levels-up during the second year before steadily decreasing during the 
next three years and disappearing in the fifth year. Thirdly, from Figure 3, a positive shock in 
financial size sharply increases output over the next two years, after which the effect also 
sharply drops for a year before falling steadily during the next two years and disappearing in 
the fifth year. 
From the second VAR ordering in Appendix 5, the positive nexuses among the 
innovations of output in money supply (Figure 4), financial deposits (Figure 5) and financial 
size (Figure 6) are consistent with the predications of economic theory. Accordingly, a one 
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standard deviation positive innovation (shock) in output increases financial dynamic 
fundamentals of depth (size) during the first (first-two) year(s). The effects disappear in the 
third year, fourth year and fifth year for money supply (Figure 4), liquid liabilities (Figure 5) 
and financial size (Figure 6) respectively.  
 
4.6 Robustness checks  
 
In order to ensure that our results and estimations are robust, we have performed and 
checked the following.  (1) For almost every monetary policy variable (money, efficiency or 
credit) two indicators have been employed. Thus, the findings have encapsulated measures of 
monetary policy dynamics both from banking and financial system perspectives.  (2) By using 
bivariate analysis in cointegration tests and correspondingly in VECM estimations, we have 
focused on the problem statements and limited (mitigated) causality misspecification issues. 
(3) Optimal lag selection for goodness of fit in model specifications has been consistent with 
the recommendations of Liew (2004)
15
. (4) Simple Granger causality has been carefully 
calibrated to be consistent with the Engle-Granger theorem. (5) In the error correction 
analysis, the ability of financial allocation efficiency to insignificantly contribute in restoring 
inflation to its long-run equilibrium is consistent with the estimates of financial activity
16
. (6) 
The signs and intervals of the ECTs conform to theory. It is worthwhile laying emphasis on 
this seventh point. As a matter of principle, the speed of adjustment should be between zero 
and ‘minus one’ (0, -1) for a stable error correction mechanism. Therefore, if the ECTs are not 
                                                 
15
 “The major findings in the current simulation study are previewed as follows. First, these criteria managed to 
pick up the correct lag length at least half of the time in small sample. Second, this performance increases 
substantially as sample size grows. Third, with relatively large sample (120 or more observations), HQC is 
found to outdo the rest in correctly identifying the true lag length. In contrast, AIC and FPE should be a better 
choice for smaller sample. Fourth, AIC and FPE are found to produce the least probability of under estimation 
among all criteria under study. Finally, the problem of over estimation, however, is negligible in all cases. The 
findings in this simulation study, besides providing formal groundwork supportive of the popular choice of AIC 
in previous empirical researches, may as well serve as useful guiding principles for future economic researches 
in the determination of autoregressive lag length” (Liew, 2004, p. 2).  
16
 As we have observed, if allocation inefficiency is a substantial cause for the insignificant contribution of the 
monetary policy variable of financial efficiency in adjusting inflation to its long run equilibrium, then 
correspondingly, financial activity (credit) which indirectly reflects bank  efficiency (ability of banks to 
transform deposits into credit) should also be insignificant in adjusting inflation to its long-run equilibrium 
relationship. This hypothesis is consistent with our findings.  
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within this interval, then either the model is misspecified (and needs adjustment), the data is 
inadequate (perhaps owing to issues with degrees of freedom)
17
 or ultimately the error 
correction mechanism is unstable.  
 
4.7 Discussion and policy implications 
 
4.7.1 Retrospect to tested hypotheses  
 
Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the long-run but not in the short-run. 
For the first-half (long-run dimension) of the hypothesis, permanent changes in 
monetary policy variables (depth, efficiency, activity and size) affect permanent variations in 
prices in the long-term. But in cases of disequilibriums only financial dynamic fundamentals 
of depth and size significantly adjust inflation to the cointegration relations. With respect to 
the second-half (short-run view) of the hypothesis, monetary policy does not overwhelmingly 
affect prices in the short-term. Hence, but for a thin exception Hypothesis 1 is valid.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in the short-term but not in the 
long-term. 
With regard to the short-term dimension of the hypothesis, only financial dynamics of 
depth and size affect real GDP output in the short-run. As concerns the long-run dimension, 
the neutrality of monetary policy has been confirmed. Hence, the hypothesis is also broadly 
valid.  
Accordingly, had we used only the 1987-2006 sample period and restricted monetary 
policy variables to fundamental financial dynamics of depth and size, both hypotheses would 
have been overwhelmingly valid.  
 
                                                 
17
 “The error correction term tells us the speed with which our model returns to equilibrium following an 
exogenous shock. It should be negatively signed, indicating a move back towards equilibrium, a positive sign 
indicates movement away from equilibrium. The coefficient should lie between 0 and 1, 0 suggesting no 
adjustment one time period later, 1 indicates full adjustment. The error correction term can be either the 
difference between the dependent and explanatory variable (lagged once) or the error term (lagged once), they 
are in effect the same thing” (Babazadeh & Farrokhnejad, 2012, p.73).  
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4.7.2 Implications for the long-run neutrality of money and business cycles  
 
Economic theory has traditionally suggested that monetary policy can influence the 
business cycle, but not the long-run potential output. Despite theoretical and empirical 
consensus on money neutrality well documented in the literature, the role of money as an 
informational variable for money policy decisions has remained opened to debate with 
empirical works providing mixed outcomes. By using hitherto unemployed monetary policy 
variables, results offer only partial support for the traditional economic theory. While 
evidence of the long-run neutrality of money has been confirmed, the influence of monetary 
policy in short-run economic activity is apparent only with respect to monetary policy 
fundamentals of depth and size, with a greater effect from the latter (see discussion on IRFs). 
It follows that contractionary and expansionary policies based on financial size would be 
more effective than those based on financial depth. Overall, this finding is not consistent with 
studies on two middle-income countries by Agenor et al. (2000), which establish no evidence 
of Granger-causality flowing from money to output, regardless of the measurement of money 
used.  
 The inability of monetary policy fundamentals of efficiency and activity to affect 
output in the short-run indicates that they cannot be used as policy instruments to influence 
business cycles (through expansionary and contractionary policies). Surplus liquidity issues 
(financial allocation inefficiency) and limited credit facilities (financial inactivity) could 
explain this side of the findings.  
 
4.7.3 Implications for credit expansions and inflationary tendencies 
 
 There is a general consensus among analysts that significant money stock expansions 
that are not coupled with sustained credit increases are less likely to have any inflationary 
tendencies. This is at least true in the long-run because monetary policy variables theoretically 
have no incidence on prices in the short-term. This paper has reframed the consensus into an 
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important question policy makers are most likely to ask today. In the long-run, do short-term 
adjustments in monetary policy variables matter in the restoration of the long-run inflation-
money equilibrium? The findings have three mains implications on this account: (1) there are 
significant long-run equilibriums between inflation and monetary policy variables; (2) the 
error correction mechanism is stable such that,  in event of a disequilibrium, for all monetary 
policy variables under consideration, inflation is adjusted to the long-run relationship and; (3) 
only adjustments in the monetary policy fundamentals of financial size and financial depth are 
significant in the restoration of inflation to its equilibrium. This broadly implies that financial 
depths and size (if well calibrated) could be used for inflation targeting by the monetary 
authorities.  
 
4.7.4 Implications for inflation targeting  
 
 Three main policy implications could be derived with respect to inflation targeting. 
Firstly, we have seen that financial depth is a significant tool in fighting inflation with the 
effect of money supply doubling that of liquid liabilities. This difference in magnitude is 
broadly consistent with the fundamentals of financial development in African countries. It  
has been substantially documented that, a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit 
through the banking sector (Asongu, 2012c). Hence, it is only normal to expect that 
adjustments in bank deposits (liquid liabilities) are less significant in magnitude in the 
restoration of inflation to its long-term equilibrium. Corollary to this explanation is the 
growing phenomenon of mobile banking and other informal financial activities that contribute 
to inflation but are not captured by formal (mainstream) financial (banking) activities 
(Asongu, 2013d). Secondly, we have also noticed that the monetary policy variable of 
financial size (in terms of magnitude) more significantly adjusts inflation than financial 
intermediary depth (from money supply and liquid liabilities perspectives). In plainer terms, 
decreasing financial intermediary assets (in relation to total assets in the financial system) 
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more substantially exerts deflationary pressures on consumer prices. It could thus be inferred 
that, tight monetary policy targeting the ability of banks to grant credit (in relation to central 
bank credits) is more effective
18
 in fighting consumer price inflation than that targeting the 
ability of banks to receive deposits (financial depth).  Thirdly, we have also seen that 
monetary policy variables of financial depth and financial size are more significant adjusters 
of inflation than financial efficiency and activity. The inherent surplus liquidity issues in 
African banks still explain this insignificance in adjustments (Saxegaard, 2006).  
 
4.7.5 Implications for the ongoing monetary policy debate 
 
 The monetary policy effects (long-run and short-term) on economic activity (output 
and prices) are broadly consistent with traditional discretionary monetary policy arrangements 
that favor commitment to price stability and international economic integration (such as 
inflation targeting, monetary unions…etc). Hence; on the one hand, a flexible countercyclical 
monetary policy (with financial fundamentals of depth and size) can be practiced with 
inflation targeting (Ghironi & Rebucci, 2000; Mishkin, 2002) and; on the other hand, 
contractionary and expansionary monetary policies based on financial depth and size can be 
used to offset output in the short term (Starr, 2005).    
 Conversely, the absence of short-run effects from some monetary policy fundamentals 
on output is in line with the second strand of the debate which sustains that non-traditional 
policy regimes limit the ability of monetary authorities to use policy to offset output 
fluctuations. The inability of monetary policy authorities to use financial fundamentals of 
efficiency and activity to affect short-run real GDP is consistent with Week (2010) who views 
this IMF oriented approach as absurdly inappropriate because a vast majority of governments 
                                                 
18
 Effectiveness here refers to the rate at which inflation is adjusted to its long-run equilibrium.  
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in SSA countries lack the instruments to make monetary policy effective
19
. From our findings, 
the monetary authorities can only use policy instruments of depth and size to offset adverse 
shocks to output by pursuing either an expansionary or a contractionary policy. In the same 
vein, we have also discovered that financial fundamentals of efficiency and activity do not 
significantly adjust inflation to the long-run equilibrium (see Table 4).  
 
4.7.6 Implications for monetary policy independence 
 Beside the underlying hypotheses motivating the inquiry, the empirics have given birth 
to another hypothesis of monetary policy independence. While the intuition of and 
justification for the hypothesis have already been substantially covered in Section  4.2, it 
is relevant to take stock of how the assumption of monetary policy independence has 
influenced the results. Two points clearly stand out. Firstly, the assumption has not affected 
the relevance of Hypothesis 2 for two main reasons: on the one hand, the Westerlund (2007) 
and Pedroni (1999) tests are consistent on the long-run neutrality of money; on the other hand, 
short-run Granger estimates are not affected (see Panel A2 and Panel B2 in Table 5). 
Secondly, if the hypothesis of independence in monetary policy is relaxed, two facts emerge: 
on one hand, only financial efficiency has a long-term equilibrium with inflation and; on the 
other hand, in case of disequilibrium, adjustments in the fundamental dynamics of allocation 
efficiency do not significantly adjust inflation to the cointegration relationship. Ultimately, the 
issue of surplus liquidity still emerges even without the hypothesis of monetary policy 
independence.   
4.7.7 Country/regional-specific implications  
 
 We now devote space to discussing specific implications for some of the sampled 
countries.  The surplus liquidity issues may be due to the weight of political instability in 
                                                 
19
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) places great emphasis on monetary policy in its programs for 
developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It views such policy as crucial in managing inflation and 
stabilizing the real exchange rate.  
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some of the sampled countries. Fielding & Shortland (2005) have established a positive nexus 
between violent political incidents (arising from conflicts between radical Islamic groups and 
the Egyptian state) and excess liquidity.  While categorizing ‘conflict-affected’ countries 
present analytical and practical difficulties, essentially because few countries in the world are 
completely conflict-free, few would object the extension of the Fielding & Shortland 
interpretation to Nigeria and Sudan. Also, Uganda is still technically at war with the Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA) because its leader Kony (who refused to sign the 2007 peace 
agreement) is still at large. Beyond pointing out countries that have experienced conflicts 
during a significant interval of the sampled period, it is also relevant to emphasize that in the 
same vein, the protracted Arab Spring revolutions (Egyptian and Tunisian) and sectarian crisis 
in Nigeria would only fuel excess liquidity issues.  
 Like most countries in the sample, since 2002 the Bank of Algeria has conducted 
active policy aimed at solving the problem of excess liquidity. The plethora of measures 
implemented to curb the issue has led to some satisfactory results (IMF, 2013, p. 22). The 
internal impediments to financial intermediation are being exacerbated by Lesotho’s small 
size and its proximity to South Africa. Accordingly, the excess liquidity management 
measures may not sustain the domestic economy in the long run. While potential customers 
are taking businesses to the much better and developed South African market, at the same 
time, instead of looking for business opportunities in Lesotho, the banks are investing excess 
liquidity in South African securities.  
 A recent short-run Schumpeterian trip to embryonic African monetary zones (Asongu, 
2013c) has established a positive causality flowing only from financial efficiency to real GDP 
output for the East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ) and none for the West African Monetary 
Zone (WAMZ). Hence, these results indirectly confirm the need to implement structural and 
institutional convergence reforms by candidate members of the potential monetary unions 
(especially the WAMZ).  
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4.7.8 Fighting surplus liquidity 
 It is also relevant to devote space in discussing how to fight surplus liquidity in 
African banking institutions for two main reasons. Firstly, as we have seen above it is a 
common issue resulting from monetary policy independence and dependence scenarios. 
Secondly, the two hypotheses motivating the empirics would have been overwhelmingly 
validated only and only if we had used the 1987-2006 sample period and restricted monetary 
policy variables to fundamental financial dynamics of depth and size.  
 Measures aim at tackling over-liquidity will be efficient if they are consistent with the 
reasons for holding liquidity: voluntary or involuntary. Firstly, voluntary holding of excess 
liquidity could be mitigated by: easing difficulties encountered by banks in tracking their 
positions at the central bank that may require them to hold reserves above the statutory limits; 
reinforcement of institutions that would favor interbank lending so as to ease borrowing 
between banks for contingency purposes and; improve infrastructure so that remote bank 
branches may not need to hold excess reserves due to transportation problems. Secondly,  
involuntary holding of excess liquidity could also be avoided by: decreasing the inability of 
banks to lend, especially in situations where interest rates are regulated
20
; creating conditions 
to sustain the spread between bonds and reserves so that, commercial banks can invest excess 
liquidity in the bond markets; stifling the unwillingness of banks to expand lending by 
reducing asymmetric information and lack of competition and; developing regional stock 
exchange markets to broaden investment opportunities for commercial banks.  
 
4.7.9 Caveats and future directions  
 
 The first draw-back to the analysis is the limited sample in the dataset. We have 
limited our sample to only 10 countries because of substantial reasons already discussed in the 
                                                 
20
 For instance this is the case of the CEMAC region where the central bank sets a floor for lending rates and a  
ceiling for deposit rates above and below which interest rates are negotiated freely. 
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data section.  Hence, generalization of the results to the entire African continent should be 
treated with caution. Secondly, while the intuition motivating the empirics is sound and the 
employment of all fundamental financial dynamics identified by the Financial Development 
and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB) innovative, interest rates and 
exchange rates have not been directly taken into account. Thirdly, given the length of the 
sample period, there could have been structural breaks or regime shifts which have not been 
taken into account due to technical and logistical reasons. Fourthly, we have only considered 
financial intermediary determinants of output and inflation in the analysis. However, in the 
real world, economic activity in terms of output and inflation are endogenous to a complex set 
of variables: exchange rates, wages, price controls…etc. Therefore, the interaction of money, 
credit, efficiency and size elasticities of inflation and output with other determinants of 
economic activity could result in other dynamics of consumer price and output variations.  
Hence, replicating the analysis in a multivariate VAR context would be interesting. Another 
interesting future research direction could be to assess whether the findings apply to country-
specific cases of the sample. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
While in developed economies, changes in monetary policy affect real economic 
activity in the short-run but only prices in the long-run, the question of whether these 
tendencies apply to developing countries remains open to debate. In this paper, we have 
examined the real effects of monetary policy using a battery of estimation techniques in 
inflation-chaotic African countries for the period 1987-2010. By using a plethora of hitherto 
unemployed financial dynamics (that broadly reflect monetary policy), we have provided 
significant contributions to the empirics of money. Two main hypotheses have been tested. 
Hypothesis 1: Monetary policy variables affect prices in the long-run but not in the 
short-run. For the first-half (long-run dimension) of the hypothesis, permanent changes in 
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monetary policy variables (depth, efficiency, activity and size) affect permanent variations in 
prices in the long-term. But in cases of disequilibriums only financial dynamic fundamentals 
of depth and size significantly adjust inflation to the cointegration relations. With respect to 
the second-half (short-run view) of the hypothesis, monetary policy does not overwhelmingly 
affect prices in the short-term. Hence, but for a thin exception Hypothesis 1 is valid.  
Hypothesis 2: Monetary policy variables influence output in the short-term but not in 
the long-term. With regard to the short-term dimension of the hypothesis, only financial 
dynamics of depth and size affect real GDP output in the short-run. As concerns the long-run 
dimension, the neutrality of monetary policy has been confirmed. Hence, the hypothesis is 
also broadly valid.  
Accordingly, had we used only the 1987-2006 sample period and restricted monetary 
policy variables to fundamental financial dynamics of depth and size, both hypotheses would 
have been overwhelmingly valid. Moreover, but for  slight exceptions, the tested hypotheses 
are valid under monetary policy independence and dependence. The conclusion of the 
analysis is a valuable contribution to the scholarly and policy debate on how money matters as 
an instrument of economic growth.  A wide range of policy implications have been discussed.  
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics and Presentation of Countries  
Panel A : Summary Statistics 
  Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser. 
 
 
 
Monetary 
Policy 
Dynamics  
 
Financial 
Depth  
Money Supply 0.384 0.256 0.001 1.141 240 
Liquid Liabilities  0.310 0.218 0.001 0.948 240 
       
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking  System Efficiency 0.642 0.346 0.139 2.103 240 
Financial System Efficiency 0.644 0.343 0.139 1.669 240 
       
Financial 
Activity  
Banking System Activity 0.203 0.194 0.001 0.825 240 
Financial System Activity 0.213 0.207  0.001 0.796  240 
       
Fin. Size  Banking System Size  0.672 0.299 0.017 1.609 240 
        
Output Variable Real Gross Domestic Product 10.193 0.628 8.561 11.340 240 
       
Price  Variable  Consumer   Price  Index  19.714 31.862 -9.616 200.03 240 
       
Panel B : Presentation of countries (10) 
Algeria, Egypt, Lesotho, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania 
       
S.D: Standard  Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser : Observations. Fin: Financial.  
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Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (Annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Real Output  Output  Logarithm of Real GDP World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic financial depth 
(Money Supply) 
M2 Monetary Base plus demand, saving and time 
deposits (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system depth 
(Liquid liabilities) 
Fdgdp Financial system deposits (% of GDP)   World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system allocation 
efficiency 
BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system allocation 
efficiency 
FcFd Financial system credit on Financial system 
deposits  
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking system activity Pcrb Private credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial system activity Pcrbof Private credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Size  Dbacba  Deposit bank assets/ Total assets (Deposit bank 
assets plus Central bank assets) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Infl: Inflation. M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial 
system deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions. 
WDI: World Development Indicators. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis   
Financial Depth Fin. Efficiency Financial Activity Fin. Size Inflation GDP  
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba Infl. Output  
1.000 0.993 0.146 0.183 0.796 0.778 0.513 -0.332 0.501 M2 
 1.000 0.157         0.189 0.801 0.782 0.538 -0.354 0.464 Fdgdp 
  1.000 0.949 0.630 0.646 0.392 -0.173 0.284 BcBd 
   1.000 0.668 0.708 0.371 -0.195 0.274 FcFd 
    1.000 0.987 0.536 -0.321 0.422 Pcrb 
     1.000 0.546 -0.339 0.412 Pcrbof 
      1.000 -0.323 0.385 Dbacba 
       1.000 -0.219 Inflation 
        1.000 Output 
          
M2: Money Supply. Fdgdp: Liquid liabilities. BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposit  (Banking  System Intermediary Efficiency). FcFd: 
Financial credit on Financial deposits (Financial System Intermediary Efficiency). Pcrb: Private domestic credit by deposit banks (Banking 
System Intermediary Activity). Pcrbof: Private credit domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions (Financial System 
Intermediary Activity). Dbacba: Deposit bank asset on Total assets (Banking system size).  Infl: Inflation. Fin: Financial.  
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Appendix 4: IRFs with VAR ordering: economic activity; monetary policy 
 
Figure 1: Dynamic responses of Output and Money Supply 
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Figure 2: Dynamic responses of Output and liquid liabilities  
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Figure 3: Dynamic responses of Output and financial size  
 
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(LOGREALGDP) to D(LOGREALGDP)
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(LOGREALGDP) to D(DBACBA)
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(DBACBA) to D(LOGREALGDP)
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(DBACBA) to D(DBACBA)
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
37 
 
 
Appendix 5:  IRFs with VAR ordering: monetary policy; economic activity 
 
Figure 4: Dynamic responses of Output and Money Supply 
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Figure 5: Dynamic responses of Output and liquid liabilities  
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Figure 6: Dynamic responses of Output and financial size 
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